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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

ENOCH HANKERSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020974-CA

:

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from three criminal cases interwoven by the issue on appeal.
In the first case,1 Appellant Enoch Hankerson was convicted of burglary, a
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 2002) and theft,
a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), in the Third
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Judge, presiding.2
In the second case,3 Mr. Hankerson was charged was four different theft and
burglary crimes. At trial, this case was consolidated into the third case.

1

This was case number 021200163FS below. In this brief, cites to this record will be
referred to as "First Case" plus the record number.
2

A copy of the minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is included in
Addendum A.
3

This was case number 021200272FS below. Cites to this record will be referred to as
"Second Case" plus the record number. At trial, this case was consolidated into the third case,
case number 021200271FS.

In the third case,4 Mr. Hankerson was convicted of two counts of burglary, a
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 2002); theft, a
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999); and receiving
or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-1 a-1316, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable
Joseph C. Fratto, Judge, presiding.5
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002), which grants this Court jurisdiction over appeals from convictions
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Under section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code, charges pending against a prisoner must
be dismissed if he is not tried within 120 days after giving the warden's authorized agent
a written request for disposition. Here, Mr. Hankerson gave his request three times, but
the agent acted only upon the final request. Consequently, the trials took place more than
120 days after the first request. Should the charges have been dismissed?
Standard of Review: Overall, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard to a
4

This was case number 021200271FS below. Cites to this record will be referred to as
"Third Case" plus the case number.
5

A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is attached in
Addendum B.
2

trial court's decision about whether to dismiss charges under the 120-day disposition
statute. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^3, 34 P.3d 790. However, underlying
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, and underlying findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error. Id. at Tf4.
Preservation: This issue was preserved in all three cases at First Case 56-77.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the issue on
appeal. The Amendment reads, in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public t r i a l . . . .
U.S. Const, amend VI.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution is relevant to the issue on appeal.
The provision reads, in pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to have a speedy
public t r i a l . . . .
Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
Section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code, "Disposition of Pending Charge," is
determinative to the issue on appeal. The text of that statute is attached in Addendum C.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The chronology of events in the three trial cases below is critical to the issue, so
the proceedings are listed in order as follows:
March 6, 2002:

Mr. Hankerson is charged in the First Case
with one count of burglary, a second-degree
felony, and one count of theft, a third-degree
felony. First Case 2-4.

March 15, 2002:

Mr. Hankerson is charged in the Third Case
with receiving or transferring a stolen motor
vehicle, a second-degree felony, purchase,
possession or use of a firearm by a restricted
person, a second-degree felony, and
burglary, a second-degree felony. Third
Case 3-5.

March 21, 2002:

Mr. Hankerson is charged in the Second
Case with one count of burglar/, a seconddegree felony, and three counts of theft, a
second-degree felony. Second Case 6-8.

March 24, 2002:

From prison, Mr. Hankerson executes a
"Notice and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charge[s]lf for all three cases. First
Case D. Ex. 2; Third Case 43-44.

April 9, 2002:

Records office at the Utah State Prison
receives the Notice. The Notice is labeled
"Void" and returned to Mr. Hankerson
because he did not meet "the indigent
requirements" or have sufficient funds in his
prison account to cover the certified mailing
costs. First Case D. Ex. 2.

April 15, 2002:

Mr. Hankerson executes a second "Notice
and Request for Disposition of Pending
Charge[s]" in all three cases. Third Case 474

48, 188.
April 19, 2002:

Records office receives the Notice. Third
Case 47-48. The Notice is rejected because
Mr. Hankerson was not considered indigent
and did not have money in his account to
pay the certified mailing costs. Id at 50.

May 9, 2002:

Mr. Hankerson executes a third "Notice and
Request for Disposition of Pending
Charge[s]M in all three cases. First Case S.
Ex. 1.

May 17, 2002:

Records office receives the Notice and, this
time, forwards it to the State with a
"Certificate of Inmate Status." Id

June 26, 2002:

Preliminary hearing is held in all three cases.
Mr. Hankerson is bound over on all of the
charges. First Case 176 [14-15]; Second
Case 33-34; Third Case 23-25.

August 2, 2002:

Defense counsel files, in all three cases, a
"Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss for
Failure to Comply with Request for 120 Day
Disposition." First Case 56-77; Third Case
32-39.

August 9, 2002:

Hearing is held on the Motion to Dismiss.
First Case 177 [4-1]; Third Case 88-89. The
court finds that the first Notice and Request
for Disposition of Pending Charge [s] was
proper, and should have been forwarded to
the State. First Case 153. However, the
court ruled that there was good cause for the
delay because of the confusion caused by
Mr. Hankerson's multiple requests. Id. at
153-54.

August 14-15, 2002:

The Second Case and the Third Case are
5

consolidated and a jury trial is held. Second
Case 43-44; Third Case 128-29. Mr.
Hankerson is convicted on two counts of
burglary, a second-degree felony; theft, a
second-degree felony; and receiving or
transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a
second-degree felony. Third Case 128-29,
175-76.
August 15, 2002:

Jury trial is held in the First Case. First Case
89. Mr. Hankerson is convicted of burglary
and theft, as charged. First Case 133-36.
The sentences include consecutive terms of
1-15 years for burglary and 0-5 years for
theft. Id. at 145-46.

October 16,2002:

In the consolidated Second Case and Third
Case, Mr. Hankerson is sentenced to
consecutive terms of 1-15 years for each of
the two burglary counts, 1-15 years for theft,
and 1-15 years for receiving or transferring
a stolen motor vehicle. Third Case 178-80.
These sentences are to run consecutively
with the sentences in the First Case. Id.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts underlying the three cases are not relevant to the issue on appeal, which
focuses solely on procedural and constitutional issues. However, a brief summary of each
case is given for general briefing purposes.
In the first case, a Salt Lake City home was burglarized. First Case 176 [2-2].
Items stolen from the home included jewelry, a jewelry box, and a digital camera. Id. at
4. That same day, a patrol officer pulled over a car with an inoperable brake light. Id. at

2-7. The police eventually sea^

d the car, and found some of the items from the

burglary, hi Mr. Hankerson wa^ ^ne of the passengers in the car. Id.
In the second case, another Salt Lake City home was burglarized. Second Case 70
[2]. Items taken included three rifles, a DVD player, a computer, and a church cash box.
Id at 3, 6-7. That same day, there was a hit-and-run incident. Id. at 13. One of the
vehicles involved in the crash was allegedly driven by Mr. Hankerson. That vehicle was
taken into custody and inventoried, and many of the items from the burglary were
discovered. Id. at 14.
In the third case, a car was stolen from a driveway. Third Case 210 [4-5]. That
same day, the car was involved in a collision near Granite High School. Id. at 32. Police
testified that, after the collision, a man later identified as Mr. Hankerson emerged from
the car and ran away. Id at 11, 17, 34-35. He was eventually apprehended. Third Case 6.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Mr. Hankerson's convictions should be reversed because his speedy trial rights, as
they are enunciated in Utah's 120-day disposition statute, were violated.
Under the 120-day disposition statute, any untried charges against a prisoner must
be tried within 120 days if the prisoner delivers a properly-executed written request to the
warden's authorized agent. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999). Once the agent
receives the request, it must inform the court and prosecutor as soon as possible by

7

forwarding the request along with information about the prisoner's inmate status. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2) (1999).
Despite this clear statutory mandate, the prison records office did not forward Mr.
Hankerson's properly-executed request for disposition to the court or prosecutor. Instead,
pursuant to internal policy, it reviewed his prison account to see whether he had enough
money to cover the certified mailing costs, or whether he qualified as indigent.6 He
couldn't cover the costs and he did not qualify as indigent. So, his request was marked
"void" and returned to him. First Case D. Ex. 2. He delivered a second request and the
same thing happened. Third Case 50. Only the third request was forwarded to the
prosecutor. First Case S. Ex. 1. As a result, Mr. Hankerson's trials were held more than
120 days past his first request,7 and his speedy trial and 120-day disposition rights were
violated.
The trial court, while acknowledging the illegality of the prison records' policy,
ruled that the lateness of Mr. Hankerson's trials was justified because: 1) his Motion to
Dismiss due to failure to prosecute within 120 days delayed the trials, and 2) Mr.
Hankerson's filing of three different 120-day disposition requests confused the
prosecutor about the appropriate commencement date. Third Case 187-88. Both of these
6

First Case 177 [4-4]. Under the prison records office's standards, a prisoner cannot be
deemed indigent unless he has had less than $9 in his account for a consecutive 45 days. Id.
7

The trial in the first case was nine days late. First Case 89-91. The trial in the
consolidated second and third cases was eight days late. Second Case 43-44; Third Case 128-30,
175-76.
8

rulings are definitive error. First of all, the Motion to Dismiss did not delay the trials. The
trials were already set before the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was scheduled, and
the Motion to Dismiss did not disturb the schedule at all. First Case 177 [3-3]. Secondly,
the idea that Mr. Hankerson caused confusion by filing three requests is unsupportable. It
is the prison records office that caused confusion by forwarding only the last request to
the prosecutor. And, as has already been decided in this State, such administrative errors
cannot toll the 120-day period. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998).
Besides all of this, the State failed in its statutory obligation to move the case
forward to meet the 120-day deadline.8 Even though the prison records office forwarded
only the last 120-day disposition request, dated May 17th, to the prosecutor, First Case S.
Ex. 1, the prosecutor was aware at least by July 30th that the original request was
executed in late March. First Case 177 [3-2]. The defense counsel informed the court and
prosecutor of this during the pretrial conference. Id. Then, three days later, the defense
counsel provided the prosecutor with a copy of the original request. Third Case 42-44.
Nonetheless, the prosecutor did nothing to hurry the case along. He didn't try to move
the trial dates up even though there was still time to try the cases.9 He didn't even try to

8

JSee Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 ("When a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the
detainer statute, the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard
within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify the court that a detainer
notice has been filed and to make a good faith effort to comply with the statute.")
9

Going by the original 120-day request, the deadline for the trials was August 6th. Third
Case 187.
9

get a few days' waiver from Mr. Hankerson. This shows that the prosecutor failed to
meet its statutory obligation to move the case forward.
In sum, Mr. Hankerson's conviction cannot be sustained because his speedy trial
and 120-day disposition rights were violated. Accordingly, his conviction should be
reversed, and the charges reversed. State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1991).

ARGUMENT
I. MR. HANKERSON'S TRIALS WERE LATE BECAUSE OF THE
PRISON RECORDS OFFICE'S ILLEGAL POLICY OF RETURNING
SOME 120-DAY DISPOSITION REQUESTS TO INMATES
Mr. Hankerson's convictions in the three cases at issue should be reversed
because they were tried more than 120 days after Mr. Hankerson filed a proper request
for 120-day disposition. Further, the delay was not justified by good cause. It resulted
merely from the prison records office's failure to forward his original 120-day
disposition request to the prosecutor. First Case D. Ex. 2. Instead of forwarding it, the
records office wrote "void" on it and sent it back to Mr. Hankerson because he did not
have enough funds to pay the mailing costs, and he also did not qualify as indigent under
the records office's policy. Id. A week later Mr. Hankerson executed another request for
120-day disposition, and the records office did the same thing. Third Case 47-50. It was
not until Mr. Hankerson delivered a third request for 120-day disposition that the prison
records office finally sent the prosecutor notice of the request. First Case S. Ex. 1. This

10

resulted in late trials,10 which violated Mr. Hankerson's speedy trial rights as they are
embodied in the 120-day disposition statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999).
All of this occurred because of the prison records office's illegal policy of voiding
some prisoners' properly-executed requests for 120-day dispositions. Under this policy,
requests are forwarded to the prosecutor only if the prisoner has enough money in his
account to pay the certified mailing fees or qualifies as indigent. First Case 177 [4-4]. To
qualify as indigent a prisoner must have had less than $9 in his account for 45
consecutive days. IdL If a prisoner has had more than this, but doesn't have enough
money to pay the mailing costs when the request is received, the request is marked "void"
and returned to the prisoner. First Case D. Ex. 2; Third Case 50. The prisoner is informed
that he may file a request again when he either has enough money or qualifies as
indigent. Third Case 50.
This policy directly defies the mandate of the 120-day disposition statute. Under
that statute, the prison records office is required to immediately forward all requests for
120-day disposition to the court and prosecutor regardless of financial considerations:
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested,
to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff
10

The trials were late with regard to the first request, but not the second or third. The
trials were held August 14th and 15th. This was past the August 6th deadline applicable under the
first request, which had been delivered April 9th. Third Case 187-88. The deadlines under the
second request, delivered April 19th, Third Case 47-48, and third request, delivered May 17th,
First Case S. Ex. 1., was after August 14th and 15th.

11

or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so
notified, provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2) (1999).
This language emphasizes that it is the authorized agent who is responsible for
forwarding the request to the court and prosecutor. The prisoner, of course, completes his
responsibility once the request is delivered to the authorized agent. This is shown by the
language saying that the authorized agent must either personally deliver the request or
forward it by certified mail. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2) (1999). It is also shown by
language saying that the authorized agent of the warden "shall immediately11 forward a
120-day disposition request "to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk . . . . "
Id. Importantly, the language mandates that all properly-executed requests11 must be
forwarded. There is no exception for prisoners who lack mailing funds and don't qualify
as indigent. In fact, there are no exceptions at all. All 120-day disposition requests must

11

A properly-executed request is a request that conforms to the requirements of the
statute. The pertinent portion of the statute reads:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail
or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against
the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner
shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any
appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the
charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the
pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120
days of the date of delivery of written notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999).
12

be forwarded to the court and prosecutor. This is the plain meaning of the statute, and the
plain meaning is controlling. As has been repeatedly observed, ff[w]hen interpreting
statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain
language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous."12
What is more, the language is not ambiguous, so it is unnecessary to look further
than the plain language for meaning. But even if the plain language was not perfectly
clear, the statute must still be interpreted as placing the responsibility of forwarding the
request on the authorized agent. This is shown by an examination of the statute's
purpose.13 The statute's purpose is to clearly delineate federal and state constitutional
rights to a speedy trial as they relate to prisoners.14 More practically, the statute is also
meant to prevent law enforcers from "holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed of
charges against him." Id (citations omitted). It also compels prompt prosecution,15 and
encourages trials "while witnesses are available and their memories are fresh." Lindsay,
2000 UT App 379, 1J6 (citations omitted).
But these goals are completely undermined by the records office's policy of
12

State v. Schofield. 2002 UT 132, f 8, 63 P.2d 667 (citations omitted). See also State v.
Hodges. 2002 UT 117, ^|6, 63 P.3d 66; State v. Lindsay. 2000 UT App 379,1J5, 18 P.3d 504.
13

See Hodges. 2002 UT 177, ^6 ("Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve.") (citation omitted).
14

Lindsay. 2000 UT App 379, 1J6 (citations omitted). State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175, 1176
(Utah 1985); State v. Taylor. 538 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1975).
15

Viles, 702 P.2d at 1176.
13

returning some properly-executed requests due to lack of funds or lack of indigency. In
many cases the policy would slow down the prosecution process, and result in a late trial
rather than prompt prosecution. Even worse, it would allow the prison administration to
hang over the heads of prisoners' undisposed-of charges. And, this is precisely what the
120-day disposition statute meant to avoid.
This was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Taylor. Taylor, 538
P.2d at 313. In Taylor, the defendant had expressed anxiety about the length of time that
the warden could retain a request for disposition before sending it to the prosecutor. IcL
The Utah Supreme Court dispelled these fears by holding that any such action would
result in the reversal of a subsequent conviction:
Any attempt by the warden or his agents, to retain the request, or to fail to
complete the certificate, beyond a reasonable time, or to misdirect the
request and certificate, would violate the prisoner's right to a speedy trial,
and would provide a basis for judicial relief.
Id. This shows that the language and goals of the 120-day disposition statute may not be
undermined by any ancillary administrative policy such as the one maintained by the
prison records office.
Importantly, if the language and goals are undermined, any resulting delay cannot
work to the detriment of the prisoner. This is because, once the prisoner delivers his
written request for disposition, his part is completed. The obligation then moves to the
prison records office to forward the request to the prosecutor. Utah Code Ann. § 77-291(2) (1999). Also, it is the prosecutor who bears the burden of moving the case forward.
14

This means that the prosecutor may not stand passively by while clerical errors delay the
case, or while time simply passes. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). The
prosecutor must schedule all necessary appearances within the 120-day period, and
inform the court that prompt scheduling is necessary because of the 120-day disposition
notice. State v. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, f 14, 34 P.3d 790; State v. Petersen . 810
P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). The prosecutor must also actively avoid delays, and if the
delays are necessary, the prosecutor must minimize them. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281,
fl4; Petersen, 810 P.2d 425.
Under this law, the prison record office's failure to forward Mr. Hankerson's
original 120-day disposition request to the prosecutor and the prosecutor's subsequent
failure to prosecute within the 120 days did not toll the 120-day period. This is because
the prison records office was statutorily obligated to send Mr. Hankerson's original 120day disposition request to the prosecutor. And, the prosecutor carried the burden of
bringing the case to trial within the appropriate time frame. The failure of the prison
records office and the prosecutor to meet these obligations does not work to the
detriment of Mr. Hankerson. He did everything required of him under the statute and his
case should have been tried within 120 days of his original 120-day disposition request.
Because it was not, the charges should have been dismissed.
Although the trial court did not dismiss the charges, the court readily
acknowledged that the 120-day period commenced on April 9, 2002, when the prison

15

records office received Mr. Hankerson's original written request for disposition, and
ended 120 days later on August 6th. Third Case 187. This is because the original request
was properly-executed and referred to all three cases that were pending. First Case 177
[4-28 & 29]; Third Case 185. The request was three pages long and referred to at least
two burglary charges, plus transfer of a stolen motor vehicle, possession of a handgun by
a restricted person, and possession of drug paraphernalia. First Case Def. Ex. 2. Also,
two case numbers were listed. IcL Further, once the prosecutor received notice of the 120day disposition request, all three cases were readily identified as falling under the
request. Third Case 185. This ruling is soundly reasoned and well-supported.
Importantly, the trial court also recognized that the prison records office's policy
of voiding 120-day disposition requests for financial considerations is illegal:
The Utah State Prison does not have the legal authority to reject a
sufficiently completed Request for Disposition of Pending Charges
delivered to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any
appropriate agent of the same and is required to immediately cause the
demand to be forwarded by personal deliver[y] or certified mail, return
receipt requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk.
Third Case 187. This ruling is correct because, as has already been shown, the statute
requires that all 120-day disposition requests must be forwarded to the prosecutor. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2) (1999). So, a policy that allows only some to be forwarded
violates the statute and is illegal, as the trial court ruled.
However, the trial court made two erroneous rulings. First, the trial court
erroneously ruled that the 120-day period tolled between July 30, 2002, the date that the
16

defense counsel filed the Motion to Dismiss, First Case 177 [3-1 through 5], and August
9, 2002, the date that the Motion was denied. Id^ at 4-31. Second, the trial court
erroneously ruled that Mr. Hankerson caused confusion by filing more than one request
for 120-day disposition, and that this tolled the 120 days. These rulings will be examined
separately in the two subsections below.

A. The Motion to Dismiss did not Toll the 120 Days Because the Motion did
not Disarrange the Scheduled Trial Dates
The trial court's ruling that the Motion to Dismiss tolled the 120 days from the
time the Motion was made until it was decided is erroneous. This is because the trials
were already scheduled before the Motion was made, and they were never rescheduled
on account of the Motion or anything else. So, a delay was not created by the Motion,
and the 120-day period should not have been tolled.
The trials in all three cases were scheduled on July 2, 2002 for August 14th. First
Case 49-50; Second Case 37-38; Third Case 29-30. It was not until the pretrial
conference on July 30th that the defense counsel made the Motion to Dismiss for failure
to prosecute within 120 days. First Case 177 [3-2]. The court scheduled a hearing on the
Motion for August 9 th, and the schedules for the trials were not disturbed in any way. IdL
at 3-4. They were not postponed, nor did the prosecutor try to move them up.16 On
16

Id. The defense counsel brought the first request to the court's and prosecutor's
attention before the August 6th deadline, and so there was still time to try the cases before the 120
days expired. Id. However, the prosecutor did nothing to move the case up. This shows the
17

August 9 the hearing was held, and after the Motion was denied, it was determined that
the trials would go forward as scheduled. First Case 177 [ 4-34]. The trials were held on
the 14th and 15th, and Mr. Hankerson was convicted. First Case 145-47, Third Case 17981.
This shows that no delay was created by the Motion to Dismiss, and so no time
should have been discounted from the 120-day period. The 120-day period began on
April 9th and ended August 6th. Third Case 187. There was no good-cause delay during
this time, and the Motion certainly did not cause a delay. So, because Mr. Hankerson was
not tried by the August 6th deadline, his convictions should be reversed and the charges
dismissed.

B. The Prison's Illegal 120-day Disposition Policy, not Mr, Hankerson's
Three 120-day Disposition Requests, Delayed the Trial
The trial court's ruling that the lateness of the trials was justified beceiuse Mr.
Hankerson confused matters by filing three different requests for 120-day disposition is
poorly reasoned and incorrect. It was the prison records office's illegal policy of not
forwarding some properly-executed requests that delayed the trial, not the requests
themselves. In fact, by filing three different requests Mr. Hankerson was merely

prosecutor did not meet his statutory obligation to take action to try the cases before the 120-day
deadline. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 (120 day disposition statute places the burden of moving
case forward on the prosecutor). This is shown in the second section of this brief, "The State
Failed in its Statutory Obligation to Move this Case Forward."
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following the instructions of the prison records office, First Case Def. Ex. 21; Third Case
50, which processes all prisoners' 120-day disposition requests. Because the office had
refused to file his first and second requests, he had to file more to exercise his right to
120-day disposition. So, the trial court's ruling is wrong and should be corrected.
This is shown by the 120-day disposition statute and interpretive case law. The
statute gives allowance only for delays that have good cause:
After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown
in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be
granted any reasonable continuance.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (1999). The question of whether any delays are supported
by good cause has been the principal issue in several appeals under the 120-day
disposition statute. From this, some general guidelines have emerged. Principally, a
good-cause delay is one that is either: (1) caused by the defendant, or (2) " 'a relatively
short delay caused by unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to trial.'" Coleman,
2001 UT App 281, TJ14 (quoting Petersen. 810 P.2d at 426).
As a practical matter, some good-cause delays have included those caused by
defendants' motions,17 those made to accommodate defense counsels' schedules,18 and
those caused by defendants' requests for continuances. State v. Phathammavong. 860
P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bullock. 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985).
17

State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319, 1322 (UtahCt. App. 1991).
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Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, fl 1.
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On the other hand, delays that do not have good cause, and therefore do not justify
bringing a defendant to trial after the 120-day period, include those caused by court
administrative errors,19 those caused by a prosecutor's inaction,20 and those cziused by a
prosecutor's passive acceptance of delayed scheduling. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,

1114.
When reviewing a trial court's decision about whether a late trial is justified by
good cause, appellate courts apply a two-step process. First, the court determines when
the 120-day period commenced and when it expired. Second, if the trial was held outside
the 120-day period, the court determines whether "good cause" excused the delay.
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^[6; Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. If it did not, the conviction
must be reversed whether there is a showing of prejudice or not.21
The first step, determining when the 120-day period began and when it ended, is
easy here. That is because, as shown above, the trial court has already determined that the
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Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915.

20

Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426.
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This is made clear in the 120-day disposition statute:

In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss
the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure
of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or
not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). See also Petersen, 810 P.2d at 428.
20

120-day period began April 9, 2002, when the prison records office received Mr.
Hankerson's original written request for disposition, and ended 120 days later on August
6, 2002. Third Case 187. This ruling is correct because the original request for
disposition was properly executed and delivered to an authorized agent of the warden, as
required under section 77-29-1(1) of the Utah Code.22
However, the trial court's ruling that good cause delayed the trials is not correct.
Specifically, the trial court erroneously found that Mr. Hankerson created confusion by
filing three different requests for disposition, and this confused the prosecutor and
resulted in the trials' delay. The court ruled as follows:
5. The Court finds that good cause exists to extend the time within which
to allow the State of Utah to prosecute this matter beyond August 6, 2002,
because the Defendant's subsequent filings of 120 day disposition caused
confusion about the time period within which the Defendant was to [be]
tried.
6. The defendant filed requests for disposition of charges on April 9, 2002,
April 19, 2002, and on May 17, 2002, with the appropriate authorized
agents of the Utah State Prison: processed by the Utah State Prison and
delivered to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office and to the [Clerk of
the Court];
7. The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office has always relied on a demand
date of May 17, 2002, and the trial date of August 14, 2002, is within the
120 day time frame from the only Notice and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charges processed by the Prison.
Third Case 187-88.
22

First Case D. Ex. 2. Under the statute, the 120-day period commences when the
authorized agent receives the written request. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999); Coleman.
2001 UTApp 281,1f6n.7.
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However, these findings do not support that there was good cause justifying the
delay of the trial. This is because they do not show that the delay was caused either by
Mr. Hankerson, or by unforeseen problems which arose just before trial.23 In fact, the
court acknowledged that it was the prison's illegal policy that caused the confusion,
Third Case 187, and this cannot work to the detriment of Mr. Hankerson. Mr. Hankerson
executed a proper request and delivered it to the proper authority, and nothing more was
required of him. First Case D. Ex. 2. It was the obligation of the prison records office to
forward the request, and the burden of the prosecutor to promptly prosecute. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-29-1(2) & (3) (1999). Because these obligations were not met, the charges
should have been dismissed.
There are several cases on point. In the Utah Supreme Court case of State v.
Heaton the Court considered the issue of whether a delay caused by a court clerk's
neglect in failing to docket the case was supported by good cause. Heaton. 958 P.2d at
915. The Court determined that it was not because the prosecutor has a duty to compel
the case forward regardless of such glitches:
The mere fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor has never
been considered dispositive because to hold that good cause is supported
by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would
contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of
complying with the statute on the prosecution.

23

See Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^[14 (A good-cause delay is one that is either: (1)
caused by the defendant, or (2) a short delay caused by unforeseen problems arising immediately
prior to trial.)
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Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court also noted that, while
administrative mistakes are regrettable, the prosecutor's office must operate
independently of administrative agencies. IcL It must work on its own to push the case
forward. IcL
The recent case of State v. Coleman is also on point. In that case, this Court
emphasized that the prosecutor not only bears the responsibility of moving the case
forward, the prosecutor even has some responsibility to anticipate the filing of a 120-day
disposition request. The defendant in that case had made a routine request for a delay of
the preliminary hearing. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281 ^[14. A 120-day disposition notice
had not yet been received, and the prosecutor agreed to the delay. IdL Later, a notice was
received, but the trial was late in part because of the preliminary hearing delay. IcL Upon
review, this Court found that the State did not take its responsibility to move the case
forward seriously enough:
the prosecution, knowing that it had or could soon have an obligation to
bring the matter to trial within 120 days, may not passively accept a
defendant's delay of the preliminary hearing, and then turn around and
claim the delay kept the prosecution from meeting its burden.
Id. So, even when it is early in a case and the prosecutor has not received a 120-day
disposition request, the prosecution still has some measure of responsibility to move the
case forward.
Likewise, in State v. Petersen the Utah Supreme Court emphasized that a delay is
not justifiable simply because it "was not caused by an action or inaction of the
23

prosecutor." Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426. In that case, there was a lengthy delay that was
spawned by the defendant's need for time to resolve conflicts with his attorney. IcL Upon
review, the Court recognized that the conflict could have been resolved in much less
time, and that the lengthy delay was unnecessary. LI at 426-27. The prosecutor should
have acted to move the case forward, and because he didn't, the conviction was reversed
and the charges dismissed. Id. at 428.
These cases emphasize that the 120 days does not toll simply because of an
administrative error that is not the prosecutor's fault. This is because, whether the delay
is caused by the prosecutor or by some administrative body such as the court or prison
records office, the defendant's properly-executed and properly-delivered request for 120day disposition must still be filled. I(i Both the prosecutor and government
administrative bodies must complete their obligations, and their failure to do so does not
work to a defendant's detriment. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915.
In this case, the delay was caused by the prison records office's failure to send Mr.
Hankerson's first two requests for disposition to the prosecutor. This caused the
prosecutor's confusion about the date of commencement of the 120-day period.
Certainly, Mr. Hankerson's filing of three different requests was not the cause of
confusion. Indeed, he was simply following the instructions of the prison records office,
Third Case 50, the agency he was required to use to make the 120-day disposition
request. The government cannot instruct a prisoner to file further requests and then
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curtail his 120-day disposition rights because he followed this advice. Mr. Hankerson did
all he was required to do under the 120-day disposition statute, and he did not cause any
delay once he filed the request for 120-day disposition. So, the fact that the prosecutor
was confused about the date of commencement for the 120-day period cannot work to
Mr. Hankerson's detriment.
In sum, the trial court erred in ruling that good cause justified the late trials in this
case. Mr. Hankerson executed and delivered a written request for 120-day disposition on
April 9, 2002, and the State's failure to prosecute him by this date violated his speedy
trial and 120-day disposition rights. So, his conviction should be reversed and the
charges dismissed with prejudice.

II. THE STATE FAILED IN ITS STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO MOVE
THIS CASE FORWARD
Mr. Hankerson's conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor could have
tried this case by the August 6th deadline, but he did not do so. Of course, the prosecutor
may have been confused about the 120-day deadline because the prison records office
forwarded only the final 120-day disposition request to him. First Case S. Ex. 1.
However, the prosecutor knew at least by July 30th that this was not Mr. Hankerson's
original request. First Case 177 [3-2]. During the pretrial conference on July 30 th , the
defense counsel informed both the court and prosecutor that the original request had been
executed during the last part of March, and that a Motion to Dismiss for failure to
25

prosecute within 120 days would be filed. IdL Three days later, the Motion was filed and
a copy of the original 120-day disposition request was attached. Third Case 56-77. At
this point, there was still time to move up the trials to make the August 6 th deadline. Yet,
the prosecutor did nothing to move the case forward. He did not try to reschedule the
trials, even though he would likely have been able to get a sooner date.24 He did not even
try to get a few days' waiver from Mr. Hankerson. He simply waited until the originallyscheduled trial dates, when the 120-day deadline had already passed.
This is not enough to meet the statutory obligation to move the case forward. The
prosecutor's obligation to move the case along is well-recognized in cases such as State
v. Coleman,25 State v. Heaton,26 State v. Petersen,27 State v. Viles.28 and State v.
Lindsay.29 All these cases show that, once a prisoner has sent his 120-day disposition
request, the prosecutor is obligated to try the case by the 120th day. As the Utah Supreme
Court explained in Heaton:
When a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the detainer statute,
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He would have been able to get a sooner date because the court was able to schedule an
evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Dismiss without postponing the trial date or otherwise
disarranging its schedule. First Case 177 [3-3].
25

2001 UTApp 281414.
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958P.2dat915.
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810P.2dat426.

28

702P.2datll76.

29

2000 UT App 37, f7.
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the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard
within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify the
court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith effort to
comply with the statute.
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. The Heaton court acknowledged that a trial may be delayed for
good cause, but stressed that a prosecutor's inaction is not good cause:
ff

[G]ood cause" may support the prosecutor's failure to comply. However,
where the prosecutor's failure is inaction - in this case, doing nothing
whatsoever to bring Heaton's case to trial within the statutory period - the
trial court may not conclude that the prosecutor's failure is supported by
"good cause."
14 at 915-16.
In other words, the prosecutor must take action to meet the 120-day deadline. The
prosecutor may not allow administrative errors to delay the case, Heaton, 958 P.2d at
915, and must inform the court that prompt scheduling is necessary because of the 120day disposition notice. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, f 14; Petersen. 810 P.2d 425. The
prosecutor must also actively minimize any necessary delays. Coleman. 2001 UT App
281, ^fl4; Petersen. 810 P.2d 425. In short, the prosecutor must take actions that are
necessary to meet the 120-day deadline.
But in this case, the prosecutor did not carry out his statutory duty to move the
case forward. While the prosecutor may not have received the original 120-day
disposition request from the prison records office, he learned of the original request
before the deadline. He still had time to move the case forward, but he did not do this.
Under the case law outlined above, this amounts to a failure to meet his statutory
27

obligation. So, Mr. Hankerson's conviction should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Hankerson respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and dismiss the charges with prejudice.
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ADDENDUM A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE O
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT.
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

VS.

Case No: 021200163 FS

ENOCH HANKERSON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date;

JOSEPH C. FRATTO
October 16, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendyd
Prosecutor: WARNER, GREGORY M.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HEINEMAN, ROBERT K
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 12, 1968
Video
Tape Number:
10/16/02
Tape Count: 2:25
CHARGES
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/15/2002 Guilty
2. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/15/2002 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:

The defendant is remanded to your

Case No: 021200163
Date:
Oct 16, 2002
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Pay restitution at an amount to be determined by the Department of
Corrections ,

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
To run consecutive one with each other and with matter which
defendant is currently serving.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Pine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000,00
$0.00
$459.46
$1000.00

Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000.00
$0.00
$459,46
$1000.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$2000.00
$0
$918.92
$2000.00
Plus Interest

Case No: 021200163
Date:
Oct 16, 2002
Dated this

ADDENDUM B

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COUR1
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 0 2 1200271 J-'S

ENOCH HANKERSON,
Defendant.

Judge :
Date:

JOSEPH C . i/RATTO
October 16, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendyd
Prosecutor: WARNER, GREGORY M.
Defendant
Defendant1^ M i ,,,.,... i Mi ., HE J NEMAN, ROBERT K
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 12, 1968
Video
Tape Number:
10/16/02
Tape Count: 2:25
CHARGES
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree FelonyPlea: Not Guilty - Disposition:
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition:
3. RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN VEHICLE
Plea; Not Guilty - Disposition:
4
JRGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Dispositi n
St.'

•• -

08/15/2002 t Unity
08/15/2002 Guilty
- 2nd Degree Felony
08/15/2002 Guilty
•i

;

Mi

mil

*

Based cz: \e defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

Case No: 021200271
Date:
Oct 16, 2002

Based on the defendant's conviction of RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN
VEHICLE a 2nd Degree Felonyf the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison,
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
To run consecutive one with each other and consecutive with matter
defendant is currently serving•
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Pay restitution at an amount to be determined by the Department of
Corrections,

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000.00
$0,00
$459,46
$1000.00

Charge # 2

Fine: $1000.00
Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $459.46

Case No: 021200271
Date:
Oct 16. 2
Due: $1000.0 0
Charge # 3
Suspended
Surcharge

$a.0G0.00
$0.00
$456.24
$1000.00

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000.00
$0.00
$459.46
$1000.00

Total Fine.
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$4 0011 no

Charge # 4

Dated this /(? day of

$0
$1834.62
$4000.00
Plujnintfi
A J j t i

(

ADDENDUM C

DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

77-29-1

CHAPTER 29
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST
PRISONERS
Section
77-29-1.

Y 29 2.
77-29-3.
77-29-4.
77-29-5.

Prisoner's demand for disposition
of pending charge — Duties of
custodial officer — Continuance
may be granted — Dismissal of
charge for failure to bring to
trial.
Duty of custodial officer to inform
prisoner of untried indictments
or informations.
Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons.
Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Interstate agreement on detainers
— Enactment into law — Text of
agreement.

Section
77-29-6.
77-29-7.
77-29-8.
77-29-9.
77 29 10.
77-29-11.

Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
state agencies and political subdivisions to cooperate.
Interstate agreement — Application of habitual criminal law.
Interstate agreement — Escape of
prisoner while in temporary
custody.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
warden.
Interstate agreement — Attorney
general as administrator and
information agent.

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
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